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Abstract
We envision Artificial Intelligence marketplaces to be platforms where consumers,
with very less data for a target task, can obtain a relevant model by accessing many
private data sources with vast number of data samples. One of the key challenges is
to construct a training dataset that matches a target task without compromising on
privacy of the data sources. To this end, we consider the following distributed data
summarizataion problem. Given K private source datasets denoted by [Di]i∈[K]
and a small target validation set Dv, which may involve a considerable covariate
shift with respect to the sources, compute a summary datasetDs ⊆
⋃
i∈[K]Di such
that its statistical distance from the validation dataset Dv is minimized. We use the
popular Maximum Mean Discrepancy as the measure of statistical distance. The
non-private problem has received considerable attention in prior art, for example in
prototype selection (Kim et al., NIPS 2016). Our work is the first to obtain strong
differential privacy guarantees while ensuring the quality guarantees of the non-
private version. We study this problem in a Parsimonious Curator Privacy Model,
where a trusted curator coordinates the summarization process while minimizing
the amount of private information accessed. Our central result is a novel protocol
that (a) ensures the curator accesses at most O(K
1
3 |Ds| + |Dv|) points (b) has
formal privacy guarantees on the leakage of information between the data owners
and (c) closely matches the best known non-private greedy algorithm. Our protocol
uses two hash functions, one inspired by the Rahimi-Recht random features method
and the second leverages state of the art differential privacy mechanisms. Further,
we introduce a novel “noiseless” differentially private auctioning protocol for
winner notification, which may be of independent interest. Apart from theoretical
guarantees, we demonstrate the efficacy of our protocol using real-world datasets.
∗1Equal contribution by these authors.
33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada.
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1 Introduction
Integrating new types of data to drive analytics based decision-making can contribute significant
economic impact across a broad spectrum of industries including healthcare, banking, insurance,
travel, and urban planning. This has led to the emergence of complex data ecosystems consisting of
heterogeneous (and overlapping) data generators, aggregators, and analytics providers. In general,
participants in these ecosystems are looking to monetize a class of assets that we term AI assets; such
assets include raw and aggregated data, as well as models trained on such data. A recent Mckinsey
global survey found, for example, that more than half of the respondents in sectors including basic
materials and energy, financial services, and high tech stated that their companies had begun to
monetize their data assets [Gottlieb & Khaled (2017)].
In light of the above, in this work we consider the basic setting of an AI Marketplace : a consumer
arrives with a small dataset, referred to as a “validation” dataset, and wants to build a prediction model
that performs well on this dataset. However, the model training process requires huge amount of data,
that it must acquire from multiple private sources. Fundamentally, the AI Marketplace must address a
transfer learning problem, where the distribution of data at different sources is considerably different
from each other and even from the validation dataset. The Marketplace must facilitate transactions
of data points from multiple sources towards the consumer’s task by forming a training dataset that
is close in some distance measure to the validation dataset. In the process, it must preserve data
ownership and privacy as much as possible.
Consider the following scenario in the health care domain, as an example. Suppose the consumer
is a newly established cancer hospital and the data sources are cancer institutions from different
geographical locations across the globe. The goal of the new hospital is to construct ML models
that, say, can predict early onset of some form of cancer. The quality of the model depends on the
demography of its patients and therefore it is crucial to collect data that matches a small validation
set that is representative of the demography. The individual sources clearly have widely different
demographic data. The goal of an AI Marketplace is to enable private collection of a dataset sampled
from these sources that matches the demography of the new institute.
From the privacy perspective, there are two desirable properties: (a) The multiple data owners are
typically “competitors” and therefore, individual data must be protected (for e.g. in a differentially
private manner) from each other. (b) The platform (we use the term curator) must be “parsimonious”
in handling data, i.e., it should access information on a “need to know” basis.
Motivated by the above, we consider the following problem. We consider K data owners with private
datasets D1, . . . , DK , and a data consumer who wishes to build a model for a specific task. The
specific task is embodied by the consumer possessing a validation dataset Dv. The data consumer
would like to procure a subset of data from each private dataset which is well-matched to its task.
A parsimonious trusted curator does the collection of points. We call this the parsimonious curator
model. Although trusted, we wish to minimize the number of points accessed by the curator to
construct the the final summary. In turn, the K data owners would like to ensure that their data is
private with respect to other data owners. The curator exchanges messages and data points with the
data owners. We seek to make the exchanges by the curator to the data owners differentially private.
Our Contributions: We propose a novel protocol, based on an iterative hash-exchange mechanism,
that enables the curator to construct a summary data set Ds from the K owner datasets. A central
result of the paper shows that the proposed protocol simultaneously satisfies the following desired
properties: (i) The constructed dataset Ds is well-matched to the validation dataset Dv, in terms
of having a small Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) (Gretton et al. (2008)); (ii) The protocol
exchanges with any data owner i is (, δ)-differentially private with respect to the other owner
datasets ∪j 6=iDj ; and (iii) The parsimonious curator accesses at most O(K 13 |Ds|+ |Dv|) data points.
Qualitatively, we expect the protocol to produce data summaries that are useful for model building
while maintaining differential privacy. We show through empirical evaluation that this is indeed the
case; by examining generalization error on two example tasks, we show that the protocol pays only a
small price for its differential privacy guarantees.
Prior Work: Privacy Preserving Learning Algorithms: There is a long line of work that considers
private empirical risk minimization that seeks to optimize the trade-off between accuracy of a trained
classifier and differential privacy guarantees with respect to the training set [Kasiviswanathan et al.
(2011); Chaudhuri et al. (2011); Song et al. (2013); Kifer et al. (2012); Bassily et al. (2014); Shokri
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& Shmatikov (2015); Hamm et al. (2016); Wu et al. (2016); Abadi et al. (2016); Pathak et al. (2010);
Thakurta (2013); Rubinstein et al. (2012); Talwar et al. (2015); Dwork et al. (2014a)]. One of the most
notable in this line of work is the idea of adding noise to stochastic gradient iterations to preserve
privacy [Song et al. (2013); Abadi et al. (2016); Shokri & Shmatikov (2015)]. We do not consider the
problem of learning a classifier directly. Our goal is to summarize diverse data sources in a distributed
private manner to match a given validation set in a transfer learning setting. All the above works of
privacy preserving learning algorithms can be applied after our summarization step. In Rubinstein
et al. (2012); Chaudhuri et al. (2011), authors use noisy Rahimi-Recht Fourier features to release a
representation of the support vectors for differentially private SVM classifier release. Our purpose of
using Rahimi-Recht Fourier features is different and is used to expose the partial MMD objective at
every round and in conjunction with novel private auctioning mechanisms.
Privately Aggregating Teacher Ensembles: Several works have considered the following setting: An
ensemble of teacher classifiers, each trained on private data sources, noisily predict labels on an
unlabelled public dataset that is further used to train a student model [Papernot et al. (2016)]. Again,
this is different from our transfer learning setting where the various distributions are matched to a
target task first handling covariate shift.
Another related line of work is differentially private submodular optimization [Mitrovic et al. (2017)].
While they consider a single private source, we handle multiple private data sources in optimizing
a specific statistical distance (MMD). Finally, our techniques leverage state of the art methods on
privacy preserving mechanisms, that can be found in Dwork et al. (2014b); Hardt et al. (2012); Hardt
& Rothblum (2010).
Domain Adaptation Methods: For the transfer learning problem, the existing domain adaptation
methods [Ganin & Lempitsky (2014); Tzeng et al. (2014)] ensure the following: they learn a
representation φ(x) such that φ(·) of the source and the target are similar in distance (MMD metric
has been used to regularize the distance penalty) and that classifying based on φ(·) on the source
have very high accuracy. However, most existing approaches used differentiable models like deep
learning to achieve this - to learn φ(·). In our methods, we first match the distributions in the ambient
space by sub-selecting points and then train any suitable classifier. One advantage is that we can train
any classifier after the moment matching step (Xgboost, Decision Tree, SVMs etc.). If one wants to
make an existing domain adaptation algorithm private with respect to any pair of participants, one
has to add noise to gradients computed at every step. The state of the art in differential privacy for
deep learning [Abadi et al. (2016)] (in the non-transfer learning setting) adds Gaussian noise whose
variance is linear in the number of iterations per step which significantly degrades the performance.
In our method, we gain on this aspect as we add noise per point acquisition.
Federated Learning: We also note there is a distinction between our transfer learning setting from
that of Federated learning McMahan et al. (2016). The validation set distribution is distinct from
each of the individual data source distributions. There are significant covariate shifts between these.
Federated learning would assume a training distribution which is obtained by sampling from different
data sources uniformly at random or with a specific mixture distribution. In fact, in our experiments
we contrast with training done on uniform samples which is a proxy for federated learning.
2 Problem Setting
The setting has K data owners with private datasets denoted by D1, D2, . . . DK . Here, Di ∈ Rmi×n
where mi denotes the number of points and n denotes the their dimension. Further, there exists a
“consumer” entity that wants to form a summary dataset (which can be used for downstream training
goals) Ds ⊆
⋃
iDi and |Ds| = p. The quality of the summary set is measured by its closeness to a
target validation dataset Dv ∈ Rm×n which is private to the consumer. We measure the closeness of
Ds to Dv using the MMD (Maximum Mean Discrepancy) statistical distance defined below (refer to
Appendix A, Definition 1, for distribution based definition).
Definition: The sample MMD distance for finite datasets D ∈ Rm1×n and D′ ∈ Rm2×n is given by:
MMD2(D,D′) =
1
m21
∑
x,x′∈D
k(x, x′)− 2
m1m2
∑
x∈D,y∈D′
k(x, y) +
1
m22
∑
y,y′∈D′
k(y, y′) (1)
where k(·, ·) is a kernel function underlying an RKHS (Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space) function
space such that k(x, y) = k(y, x) and k(·, ·) is positive definite.
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Differential Privacy: We adopt the following definition of differential privacy [Dwork et al. (2006)] in
our work. On a high level, it means that two datasets that differ in at most one point should not cause
a differentially private algorithm to produce output that are very different statistically. Formally,
Definition: The output of a randomized algorithm A(D) is (, δ) differentially private with respect
to the input dataset D if for any two neighboring datasets D,D′ that differs in one data point,
P (A(D) ∈ E) ≤ eP (A(D′) ∈ E) + δ. (2)
for all events E that can be defined on the output space.
Parsimonious Curator Privacy Model: We assume that there exists a trusted curator, called aggregator,
that collects the summary data points Ds. The participants holding data Di wish to preserve the
privacy of their individual data points. The model satisfies the following constraints:a) During the
protocol run, the curator must not have access to more than ρ(|Ds|+ |Dv|) points. We refer to such
a protocol as ρ-parsimonious protocol. The aggregator needs to collect points that closely match Dv
in MMD distance. Therefore the aggregator at least sees |Ds| points in this framework. This forms a
natural |Ds|+ |Dv| lower bound on how many points the aggregator has to access. Therefore, we
define a ρ-parsimonious aggregator who sees ρ times the minimum required. b) Communication to a
non-trusted participant i is differentially private with respect to all other datasets i.e. ∪j 6=iDi ∪Dv.
This setting can be viewed as an intermediate regime between the “centralized setting" and “localized
setting” [Nissim & Stemmer (2017)] considered in the prior works. In other words, the source Di
knowing all but one point in the union of other datasets as side information must not know much
(in the differential privacy sense) about the missing point given all the communication to it during
the protocol (standard informed adversary model with respect to union of other datasets
⋃
j 6=i
Dj).
Preservation of differential privacy across data sources constrains the aggregator to collect more
points than necessary (i.e. |Ds|+ |Dv|).
Main Problem: Is there a (, δ) differentially private protocol in the parsimonious curator model, that
outputs a subset Ds ⊆
⋃
iDi : |Ds| = p that (approximately) minimizes E[MMD2(Ds, Dv)] ?
Incentives: The aggregator needs to train a downstream task on a test distribution that is similar to
Dv. To this end, |Ds| points (much larger is size than Dv) are being collected for training. In fact,
one could think of the aggregator paying for the points. Our protocol is approximately the best way
to obtain such points. There is no incentive for the aggregator to cheat since it has to pay for the
collected points. The data providers are happy to provide a set as long as they are compensated and
other data sources do not know about their data (in a differential privacy sense.).
Every data source would be able to monetize their contribution in proportion to the value they provide
to the summary. After the protocol ends, value of a data source’s contribution could be deemed
proportional to the sum of winning marginal bids from the source. Value attribution based on this
would be a incentive for data holders to participate. We address the problem of value attribution
to data sources in a companion paper (Sarpatwar et al. (2019)). We only focus on the privacy and
parsimonious constraints.
Our Approach: We briefly summarize the greedy approach to solve the moment matching problem
without privacy constraints. Our fundamental contribution is to make it differentially private in the
parsimonious curator model.
Greedy Algorithm Without Privacy: Our objective is to form a summary Ds of size p by collecting
points from all the data owners. We maximize the following normalized MMD objective [Kim et al.
(2016)] as described below. For fixed validation set Dv such that |Dv| = m and the summary set Ds,
the objective J(Ds) is as follows:
J(Ds) =
∑
i,j∈Dv
k(yi, yj)
m2
−MMD2(Dv, Ds) =
∑
i∈Dv,j∈Ds
2k(yi, xj)
m|Ds| −
∑
i,j∈Ds
k(xi, xj)
|Ds|2 (3)
Note that our objective here is different from the one used in Kim et al. (2016), in that we do not have
the property S ⊆ V . Submodularity of this function does not follow from their work directly. In
Section E of appendix, we show that the function is submodular under some condition on the kernel
function. This condition is satisfied if the distance between any two points is Ω(
√
logN) and when
the RBF kernel k(x,y) = exp(−γ‖x− y‖22) is used with some constant γ > 0.
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Theorem 1. Let N be the total number of points in the system. Given a diagonally dominant kernel
matrix K ∈ RN×N satisfying ki,i = k∗, for any i ∈ [N ] and ki,j ≤ k∗N3+3N2+N for any i 6= j, then
J(S) is a non-negative, monotone and submodular function.
It has been proven that the following iterative greedy approach yields a constant factor approximation
guarantee, given that the objective is a non-negative monotone submodular [Nemhauser et al. (1978)]
function. Iteratively, until the required summary size is achieved: (a) each participant computes
its marginally best point y, i.e., that maximizes J(Ds + y) − J(Ds) and (b) curator collects the
marginally best points from various participants and adds the best among them to the summary.
Our Private Algorithm: The focus of the paper is to adapt this greedy approach with privacy
guarantees in the parsimonious curator model. In our private protocol, the curator collects the data
points in Ds in a greedy fashion as above. However, there is a key challenge on the privacy front:
Challenges: During the implementation of the greedy algorithm, the curator maintains a set of
points Ds = {x1, . . . , xk}. To calculate the marginal gain with respect to Equation (3), we observe
that the curator needs to expose a function of the form
∑
αik(xi, ·) to every participant for some
constants αi (this will become clear later). However, sharing the points in the raw form would be a
violation of privacy constraints at the participants. Further, over the course of multiple releases, any
participant must not be able to acquire any information about previous data points of other participants.
Therefore, the key issue is that the releases of the curator must be differentially private while enabling
the computation of the (non-linear) marginal gain, over all the iterations of the protocol. Beyond
enabling the computation of “best” points, privacy concerns also arise in the actual collection of data
points. Indeed, even a private declaration of “winners” to data providers would result in the leakage
of information on the quality of other data providers.
Our Solution: To solve these issues, we use two hash functions:
(a) h1(·) based on the random Fourier features method of Rahimi-Recht to hash every data point at
the curator. This hash function is common to all the entities (i.e., curator and the participants) and
satisfies the property that h1(x)T h1(y) ≈ k(x, y) w.h.p., which is useful to convert the non-linear
kernel computation (Equation (3)) to a linear one. This enables approximate kernel computation by
an entity external to the curator. Therefore, any entity can compute the marginal gain of a new point
y by
∑
αik(xi, y) ≈
∑
αih1(xi)
T h1(y). Thus, the curator needs to only share
∑
αih1(xi).
(b) a second hash function h2(·), whose randomness is private to the curator such that,
h2(
∑
αih1(xi))
T h1(y) ≈
∑
αik(xi, y) and h2 is differentially private with respect to h1(xi).
A specific participant can observe multiple releases of
∑
αih1(xi) and potentially find out the last
point that was added. Therefore, the releases of the sum vector
∑
αih1(xi) needs to be protected.
Our h2(·) is a novel adaptation of the well-known MWEM method [Hardt et al. (2012)]. The key
technical challenge is to match the performance of the greedy algorithm while ensuring privacy
properties of h2(·) in order to protect data releases from the curator. Further, to address the privacy
concerns in parsimonious data collection, we obtain a novel private auction mechanism that is
O(K
1
3 )-parsimonious and (, δ)-differentially private, with no further loss in optimality. Aside from
theory, we provide insights to make our protocol well-suited for practice and demonstrate its efficacy
on real world datasets.
3 The Protocol
Our protocol uses two different hash functions that we refer to as h1(.) and h2(.). The hash function
h1(.) is shared between the various data owners and the aggregator. The hash function h2(.) is used
by the aggregator to hash the current summary dataset before being broadcast to various participating
entities (owners). We now describe both the hash functions h1(·), h2(·).
The Hash Function h1(·): Our first hash function, which is shared and used by various data owners
and the aggregator is based on a well known distance preserving hash function formulated by Rahimi
& Recht (2008). Formally, the hash function is defined in Algorithm 1. The main purpose of this
hash function is to ensure that h1(x)T h1(y) ≈ k(‖x − y‖). We assume an RBF kernel function
throughout the paper which is given by k(∆) = exp(−γ∆2). In Algorithm 1, p(ω) is the distribution
defined by the Fourier transform of the kernel k(∆), i.e. p(ω) = 12pi
∫
e−jω
T∆k(∆)d∆. Due to the
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RBF kernel, p(ω) = N (0, 2γIn). The randomness in the hash function is due to d random points
drawn from this distribution as in Algorithm 1.
1: Input: Point x ∈ Rn, parameter γ, dimension parameter d
2: Output: h1(x)
3: Draw {ωi}di=1 i.i.d from the same distribution p(ω) = N (0, 2γIn) only once at the beginning
of the protocol and reuse it over subsequent calls to h1(·).
4: Draw samples {bi}i∈[d] i.i.d uniformly from [0, 2pi] only once at the beginning of the protocol.
5: return h1(x) =
√
2
d
[
cos(ωT1 x+ b1), cos(ω
T
2 x+ b2) + . . . cos(ω
T
d x+ bd)
]T
Algorithm 1: Computing the hash function h1(·).
The Hash Function h2(·): Consider a dataset D ∈ Rq×d consisting of vectors {v1,v2 . . .vq} such
that vi ∈ R1×d and −
√
2
d ≤ vij ≤
√
2
d , 1 ≤ i ≤ q, 1 ≤ j ≤ d. The hash function h2(D)
approximately computes the vector sum w(D) =
∑
i vi in a differentially private manner. Let
w(D, j) =
∑
i vij . We now provide the description of the h2(·) in Algorithm 2. The algorithm has
two components: (a) The algorithm first quantizes the q vectors in D to obtain DQ such that the
quantized coordinate values are from a grid S of points S = {−1,−1+η,−1+2η... . . . 1−η, 1}, for
a parameter η (refer to Line 10 in Algorithm 2). (b) Then a random distribution Pavg over the space
of all possible quantized vectors S1×d is found such that the expected vector under this distribution is
close to the sum of the quantized vectors in DQ. Further, the releases are also differential private.
This second part relies on the MWEM mechanism of Hardt et al. (2012).
Full Algorithmic Description of h2(·) : Let v˜1, v˜2 . . . v˜q ∈ S1×d be the quantized vectors in DQ and
w(DQ, i) =
∑q
j=1 v˜ji. Now, we will define probability mass functions Pt(s ∈ S1×d) for every time
t over the finite set S1×d whose cardinality is |S|d. Pt will be dependent only on Pt−1. We will define
the distribution iteratively over t ≤ T iterations. Define w(P, i) = q(∑s∈S sPi(s)) with respect to a
probability mass function P on S1×d where Pi(s) is the marginal pmf on the i-th coordinate. The
way Pt is computed is given in Algorithm 2 (Steps 6-7).
1: Input: Dataset D, parameters ε, η and T
2: Output: h2(D,T, ε)
3: Obtain DQ ← QUANTIZATION(D, η). Let P0 be the uniform distribution over the set S1×d
where S = {−1,−1 + η,−1 + 2η... . . . 1− η, 1}.
4: for all t ≤ [T ] do
5: Sample a coordinate i ∈ [d] with probability proportional to exp (εψi(DQ)) where the score
function: ψi(DQ) = |w(Pt−1, i)− w(DQ, i)|. Let the sampled coordinate be i(t)
6: Let µi(t) ← w(DQ, i(t)) + Lap(1/ε). Compute the distribution satisfying Pt(s) ∝
Pt−1(s) exp [si(t)(µi(t) − w(Pt−1, i(t)) )/2q]
7: end for
8: Pavg =
1
T
∑
t∈[T ] Pt.
9: return
√
2
d
1
q [w(Pavg, 1) . . . w(Pavg, d)] = h2(D, ε) = h2(DQ, ε)
10: procedure QUANTIZATION(D, η)
11: Define Q(x) =
{
−1 + kη, w.p. (k+1)η−1−xη
−1 + (k + 1)η w.p.x+1−kη
}
where k = b(x + 1)/ηc. Let
Q(v = (v1, v2, . . . , vd)) = (Q(v1), Q(v2), . . . , Q(vd))
12: return DQ =
{
Q
(√
d
2vi
)}q
i=1
,
13: end procedure
Algorithm 2: Computing the hash function h2(·).
Description of the Protocol: We now describe our protocol in Algorithm 3 and the protocol parame-
ters v, `,T used. The protocol ensures two properties at the data owner:
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Approximate Marginal Gain Computation: The trusted aggregator at the beginning (Step 4) shares g˜ =
h2(h1(Dv)). We show that ‖h2(h1(Dv))−
∑
x∈Dv h1(x)‖∞ is very small. Therefore, g˜T h1(y) when
computed at a data owner with a new point y approximates
∑
x∈Dv h1(x)
T h1(y). Similarly, over
any other iteration ` (in Step 4), the hashed vector g` is such that gT` h1(y) ≈
∑
x∈Ds h1(x)
T h1(y).
Since, h1 has the property that h1(x)T h1(y) ≈ k(‖x− y‖), we can ensure that the maximization in
Step 13 is approximately the marginal gain computation J(Ds + y)− J(Ds).
Differential Privacy: We also show that, due to application of h2, all the releases seen by any
data owner i are differentially private with respect to the current summary which also implies it is
differentially private with respect to ∪j 6=iDi −Di. Another key ingredient in our proof is in showing
that the novel scheme in making the bid collection and winner notification process differentially
private, while ensuring the parsimonious nature of the aggregator. Consider the Step 7 in Algorithm 3.
Upon making a decision on the winning bid, the aggregator needs to acquire the winning point from
the winner data source. Consider the following two naive ways of doing this: (a) Aggregator notifies
the winner alone about the decision and acquires the data point. (b) Aggregator acquires data points
from all the data sources. Keeping only the winner point, it discards the other points. An important
observation here is that the first alternative is not differentially private. Indeed, it leaks information
about the data points of the participating data sources. The second way is differentially private,
indeed, each data source learns nothing new about other data sources. However, it is highly wasteful
and contradicts the parsimonious nature of the aggregator. Indeed, in forming a summary of size p, it
collects Kp data points. Our novel private auction (Steps 11-16 of Algorithm 3) obtains best of both
scenarios, i.e., it is differentially private and accesses at most O(pK
1
3 ) data points in total.
1: Input: Di i ∈ [K], validation dataset Dv , seed set Dinit, params {auc, v, {`,T }p`=1, τ}.
2: Output: Summary Ds: Ds ⊆ ∪i∈[K]Di such that |Ds| = p.
3: Aggregator initializes summary Ds ← Dinit and broadcasts g˜ = h2(h1(Dv), v).
4: for ` = 1 . . . p do
5: Aggregator broadcasts g` = h2(h1(Ds), `,T ).
6: Each Data owner i ∈ [n] computes its “bid”: bi = maxx∈Di gT` h1(x)− g˜T h1(x) ``+1 .
7: Aggregator chooses the best point through a private auction:
xi∗ ← PRIVAUCTION(bi : i ∈ [n])
8: Aggregator verifies the data point against the bid value and updates Ds ← Ds ∪ xi∗ .
9: end for
10: return Summary Ds −Dinit.
11: procedure PRIVAUCTION(bi : i ∈ [n])
12: Aggregator orders the data owners, as D′1, D
′
2, . . . , D
′
K , by their decreasingly bid values.
13: Independently with probability P[xi] = e−auc(i−1), Aggregator asks for the point xi.
14: If a certain data point x was chosen τ times by a data source (Step 6), Aggregator asks for it.
15: Aggregator discards all the points except the point xi∗ with maximum bid value bi∗ .
16: Data owners disconsider all the points sent to the Aggregator in the future iterations.
17: end procedure
Algorithm 3: Description of the protocol.
Theorem 2. Let a ∈ (0, 1) and δ˜ ∈ (0, 1/e) be any fixed constants. In Algorithm 3, for
|Dv| ≥ 44
√
2
√
d log d log2 p
εv
, |Dinit| ≥ 121 ∗ 8d2 log2 d log( 1δ˜ ) log
5 p, d ≥ 16(log 2N)(log p)2a2 , and
setting η ≤ 1d , T = d2, εv = 16T , ε`,T = √16T` log( 1
δ˜
) log p
, we obtain the following guarantees:
(Differential Privacy) Releases of the aggregator to any data owner i is (, δ˜)-differentially pri-
vate over all the iterations/epochs with respect to the datasets ∪j 6=iDi. Similarly, we have (, δ˜)-
differentially privacy over all the iterations w.r.t. validation set Dv .
(Approximation Guarantee) Let OPT denote an optimal summary set and Ds be the set of points ob-
tained by Algorithm 3. We have J(Ds) ≥ (1− 1e )J(OPT)−∆, where ∆ < O( log p
√
ln d√
d
)+a+ 1 log p <
1. Barring the ∆ additive error the guarantees are close to the non-private greedy algorithm.
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(Parsimoniousness Guarantee) Algorithm 3 is O( log
1
δ
 K
1
3 )-parsimonious, i.e., in computing a
summary of size p, it needs to access at most O(pK
1
3 ) data points.
Differences between PRIVAUCTION and the Exponential Mechanism: There may be a superficial
resemblance between Step 13 in the PRIVAUCTION procedure of Algorithm 3 and the exponential
mechanism. Actually, our private auction is significantly different. First note that the probability of
choosing the best bid is 1 which is not the case with the exponential mechanism. Secondly, while the
exponential mechanism selects one approximately "best" point, we flip a coin for every bid whose
bias has an exponentially decreasing relationship to the position of the bid in sorting order. Then, we
choose multiple of them (instead of one) and a key proof point is to show that we can restrict the
number of the points chosen overall. Finally, the bias probabilities do not even depend on the bid
value (i.e., "score") while it would be the case for exponential mechanism.
Extension to a Less Trusted Curator. In our parsimonious curator model, the final summary
dataset needs to be revealed to the trusted aggregator in order to train diverse models downstream. In
Section F of the Appendix, we show that Algorithm 3 can be adapted to share just h1(x) hashes of
data points. We show that this approach has some interesting privacy guarantees, specifically that the
aggregator can only know the pairwise Euclidean distances between the points and nothing more.
These hashes would be useful to train kernel based models such as Support Vector Machines.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We make an important observation that is crucial to obtain good performance in practice. According
to Theorem 3, in order to control the additive error in approximating the query w(D,i)q , Algorithm 2
needs: (a) T (the number of iterations) in Algorithm 2 to be larger than d2 to match the distribution
Pavg to the empirical distribution of coordinate i in the current summary Ds, (b) Dinit, the size of the
initial seed summary also needs to be large enough because of this (refer Theorem 2). Over multiple
epochs of Algorithm 3 (Step 4) , we make the following changes to deal with these issues. First
Epoch (` = 1): In practice, we ‘seed’ the protocol with a small initial seed set Dinit to satisfy (b)
and set T = Tinit to be large enough (d1.5) to satisfy (a). Subsequent Epochs (` > 1): Clearly, the
summary Ds grows and hence (b) is satisfied. We set T = Tsub to be a constant for subsequent
iterations. This may seem to contradict the requirement (a). However, we observe that h2(·) operates
on a summary that is only differing in one point from the previous iteration. Intuitively, a single
point addition results in a small shift in the empirical distribution. Small incremental changes to the
empirical distribution need to be matched incrementally. Thus, it is sufficient to have a significantly
smaller number of iterations than that in Theorem 4. Therefore, Tsub is set to be small. We set the
parameters of our algorithm as follows: the RBF kernel parameter γ = 0.1, dimension of Rahimi-
Recht hash function h1(.) as d = 140. We use two different T parameters for different epochs given
by Tinit(= T, ` = 1) = d1.5 = 1656 and Tsubs(= T, ` > 1) = 5. εv = 0.01 is the  parameter for
h2(·) for the validation set and ε`,T is set for h2(·) on summaries Ds over epochs ` as 0.05 for ` = 1,
0.01√
pTsubs
for ` > 1.
Differential Privacy: An important observation here is that we do not need to preserve the privacy
of the seed set, since it can be completely random. We now bound the differential privacy of our
parameters with respect to both the consumer data and the summary data points. Consumer Dataset
(Dv): We compute h2(h1(Dv)) only once i.e., in the first epoch. This involves Tinit = 1656 iterations
in Algorithm 2, with εv = 0.01. Applying Theorem 7 (in Appendix), we see that the total differential
privacy measure ε = 1.4 (setting δ˜ = 0.01). Summary Dataset (Ds): Over p epochs of Algorithm 3,
we have 5 iterations each with differential privacy 0.01√
pTsubs
. Thus, again by applying Theorem 7 (in
Appendix), we obtain a total differential privacy of 0.043 (with δ˜ = 0.0001).
Experiments on Real World Datasets: We now back our theoretical results with empirical experi-
ments. We compare three algorithms: a) Non-Private Greedy, where the aggregator broadcasts the
(exact) average of the hashed summary set (i.e., W (Ds,i)q ) and hashed validation set (i.e.,
W (Dv,i)
m ).
This is equivalent to the approach of Kim et al. (2016). b) Private Greedy, which is the Algorithm 3
with parameters set as above. c) Uniform Sampling, where we draw equal number pK of required
samples from each data provider to construct a summary of size p. We empirically show that private
greedy closely matches the performance of non-private greedy even under the strong differential
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privacy constraints. For comparison, we show that our algorithm outperforms uniform sampling. The
motivation for choosing the latter as a candidate comes from the typical manner of using stochastic
gradient descent approaches such as Federated Learning [McMahan et al. (2016)] that perform
uniform sampling. We experiment with two real world datasets. We discuss one of them, which is
based on an Allstate insurance dataset from a Kaggle (2014) competition. We show similar results for
the MNIST dataset, that contains image data for recognizing hand written digits, in the Appendix G.
Figure 1: All State Insurance Data: (Top): Comparison of the percentage increase in MMD2 of
both the private and uniform sampling algorithms with respect to baseline greedy algorithm. Lower
values indicate better performance. The private algorithm performs consistently better than uniform
sampling. (Bottom): Comparison of the classification accuracy of the three algorithms using a Linear
SVM classifier. Higher numbers indicate better performance. Our private algorithm outperforms
uniform sampling by 6-10% and closely matches the performance of the base line greedy algorithm.
All State Insurance Data: The dataset contains insurance data of customers belonging to different
states of the U.S. The objective is to predict labels of one of the all-state products. In our setup, we
use data corresponding to two states - Florida and Connecticut. We have four data owner participants,
and an aggregator. The data is split up as follows: Training data: The training data is comprised of
all the Florida data and 70% of the Connecticut data. The Florida data is split uniformly among the
four data owners and Connecticut data is given to one of them. This allows us to create a skew in the
data quality across different participants. Validation data: From the remaining 30% of Connecticut
data we choose 25% of data as the validation data set. Note that we remove the labels from this
validation set before giving it to the consumer. Testing data: The remaining Connecticut data is set
aside as testing data. Thus the training data is solely comprised of Connecticut data. Further, we
use around 150 points of random seed data belonging to a different state (Ohio). In our experiments,
we vary the number of samples that need to be collected and compute the MMD2 objective in
each of these cases. In Figure 1, we compare the increase in MMD2 with respect to greedy, i.e.,
MMD2(ALGM)−MMD2(GREEDY )
MMD2(GREEDY ) × 100 where ALGM is either our private greedy algorithm or
the uniform sampling algorithm. Our results show that we consistently beat the uniform sampling
algorithm while preserving differential privacy. In Figure 1, we compare the performance of these
algorithms using a linear SVM. We find that the private algorithm while closely matching greedy
beats uniform sampling by 6% to 10%.
5 Discussion
We consider a distributed data summarization problem in a transfer learning setting with privacy
constraints. Different data owners have privacy constraints and a subset of points matching a target
dataset needs to be formed. We provide a differentially private algorithm for this problem in the
parsimonious curator setting, where the data owners do not wish to reveal information to other data
owners and a curator entity can only access limited number of points.
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A Missing Definitions
We provide the definition for the distribution version of maximum mean discrepancy.
Definition 1. Maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) between two distributions P and Q is defined as:
MMD2(P,Q) = EX,X′∼P [k(X,X ′)] + EY,Y ′∼Q[k(Y, Y ′)]
− 2EX∼P,Y∼Q[k(X,Y )] (4)
where k(·, ·) is a kernel function underlying an RKHS (Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space) function
space such that k(x, y) = k(y, x) and k(·, ·) is positive definite.
B Quantization
Quantization Function Define a grid S of points S = {−1,−1 + η,−1 + 2η... . . . 1− η, 1}, where
we assume 2/η is an integer for convenience. Define a random quantization functionQ : [−1, 1]→ S
as follows:
Q(x) =
{
−1 + kη, w.p. (k+1)η−1−xη
−1 + (k + 1)η w.p.x+1−kη
}
(5)
where k = b(x + 1)/ηc. Here, the value x is quantized to one of the two nearest points from S
with probabilities chosen carefully to make sure that the expected quantization error is 0. Now,
we consider the quantized data set DQ =
{
Q
(√
d
2vi
)}q
i=1
. Observe that DQ ∈ Sq×d. Let
v˜1, v˜2 . . . v˜q ∈ S1×d be the quantized vectors in DQ. Let w(DQ, i) =
∑q
j=1 v˜ji.
C Approximation, Efficiency and Privacy Guarantees for the Protocol
Guarantees for h2(·): Now, we prove approximation and privacy guarantees for the hash function
h2(·) with respect to the input dataset it operates on. We observe that computing h2(·) involves
maintaining a distribution over | 2η |d variables which is exponentially large. We first prove that we
need only linear O
(
d
η
)
memory and update time to maintain the different distributions.
Lemma 1. In Algorithm 2, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Pt(s) needs O
(
d
η
)
memory and update time.
Proof. It is enough to prove that distribution Pt(s) satisfies the following two properties:
a) (Product Distribution): Pt(s) =
d∏
i=1
Pt(si), ∀t here Pt(si) is the marginal distribution on the
coordinate i.
b) (Marginal Update): Pt(sj) = Pt−1(sj), j 6= i(t). Pt(sj) =
Pt−1(sj) exp [sj (µj − w(Pt−1, j)/2q)] , j = i(t).
We first prove (a) by induction. The base case is true since the initial distribution is uniform. Now
suppose it is true for some t− 1, with t > 1.
Pt(s) =
Pt−1(s) exp(si(t)
µi(t)−w(Pt−1,i(t))
2q )∑
s Pt−1(s) exp(si(t)
µi(t)−w(Pt−1,i(t))
2q )
=
[
Πi 6=i(t)Pt−1(si)
] ∗ Pt−1(si(t)) exp(si(t) µi(t)−w(Pt−1,i(t))2q )∑
s Pt−1(s) exp(si(t)
µi(t)−w(Pt−1,i(t))
2q )
 (6)
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Now, ∑
s
Pt−1(s) exp(si(t)(µi(t) − w(Pt−1, i(t)))/2q)
=
∑
s
∑
s(i(t))=s
Pt−1(s|s(i(t)) = s) exp(s
µi(t) − w(Pt−1, i(t))
2q
)
=
∑
s
exp(s
µi(t) − w(Pt−1, i(t))
2q
)
∑
si(t)=s
Pt−1(s|si(t) = s)
=
∑
s
exp(s(µi(t) − w(Pt−1, i(t)))/2q)Pt−1(si(t) = s) (7)
It follows that the summation expression only depends on the coordinate i(t) and hence we have
decomposed Pt(s) into distributions that are dependent only on the coordinates. Now (b) follows by
computing the marginal distributions on each coordinate.
Now, we prove an additive approximation guarantee for every coordinate of h2(D, ε).
Theorem 3. (Expected Approximation Guarantee) Algorithm 2 has the following approximation
guarantee:
E
[
max
i∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣1qw(D, i)−
√
2
d
1
q
w(Pavg, i)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ 2
√
2 log(2/η)
d2
+ 11
√
2
log d
qε
√
d
+
4
d
+ 2d exp(−q/4) + η
After the quantization step, the algorithm for h2(·) (Algorithm 2) follows steps similar to the MWEM
algorithm of Hardt et al. (2012) but applied to the vectors in dataset DQ. The different scalar
queries on this data set are essentially the sums of the vectors in DQ along each of the d coordinates.
Therefore, we have the following theorem from Hardt et al. (2012), adapted to our case where the data
set is DQ and the set of queries are the marginal sums w(DQ, i). This gives the following guarantee:
Theorem 4. Hardt et al. (2012) For any constant c ≥ 1, with probability at least 1− 2Tdc , Algorithm
2 produces Pavg such that: maxi∈[d]|w(DQ, i)− w(Pavg, i)| ≤ 2q
√
d log|S|
T + (3c+ 2)
log d
ε .
Proof. This follows directly from Hardt et al. (2012), where we set the distribution support to be |S|d
and support of every entry in DQ to be from [−q, q].
Now, we provide an approximation guarantee for the quantization step using the Q function.
Lemma 2. E[w(DQ, i)] =
√
d
2w(D, i). With probability at least 1 − 2d exp(− q4 ), we have the
following approximation:
∣∣∣ 1q√ 2dw(DQ, i)− 1qw(D, i)∣∣∣ ≤ η
Proof. Every variable v˜ji −
√
2dvji is an independent mean zero random variable bounded in the
interval [−η, η]. Therefore, applying Chernoff Jukna (2011) bounds for bounded random variables
with deviation qη to the sum random variable w(DQ, i) and combining it with a union bound on the
d coordinates yields the result.
Proof of Theorem 3. The theorem statement follows from the following: a) | 1qw(D, i) −√
2
d
1
qw(Pavg, i)| ≤ 2 in the worst case and b) Lemma 2 and choosing the parameters T = d2, c = 3
in Theorem 4 .
Final Differential Privacy and Approximation Guarantees: We now describe the choices of
different parameters in our protocol, including, `,T over various epochs. In each of the p epochs
(note that p is the final summary size), we apply Algorithm 2. In Theorem 2, we prove that releases
of aggregator to any data owner i in our protocol are -differentially private (using the composition
theorem from Kairouz et al. (2017)) with respect to data sets of all other data owners except i. Further,
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we also bound the final expected additive error of our protocol over multiple rounds. Hence, using the
following corollary (of a theorem due to Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher) we obtain approximation
guarantees closely matching the greedy algorithm.
Theorem 5. (Corollary of Nemhauser et al. (1978)) Given a non-negative, monotone, submodular
function f : 2U → R+ ∪ {0}. Let OPT be the optimal subset maximizing f such that |OPT | ≤ p.
Similarly, let A be the subset produced by greedy algorithm such that the additive error in the
marginal gain in iteration i is ∆i. Then, f(A) ≥ (1− e−1)f(OPT )−
∑
i∈[p] ∆i
D Proof of Theorem 2
We first prove the following differential privacy guarantees on various participant releases:
Theorem 6. For any fixed 1e > δ˜ > 0, the releases of the aggregator during Algorithm 3 to the any
data owner i is (ε, δ˜)-differentially private over all the iterations/epochs with respect to ∪j 6=iDi
when we set `,T = √
16T` log( 1
δ˜
) log p
. Similarly, we have (, δ˜)-differentially privacy over all the
iterations with respect to validation set Dv , when we set εv = √16T .
We quote a recent result on composition theorems for differential privacy first.
Theorem 7. Kairouz et al. (2017) For any ` > 0, δ` ∈ [0, 1] for any ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and
δ˜ ∈ [0, 1/e], the class (`, δ`)-differentially private mechanisms satisfy (˜δ˜, 1− (1− δ˜)Πk`=1(1−δ`))-
differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition, for ˜δ˜ =
min

k∑
`=1
`,
k∑
`=1
(e` − 1)`
e` + 1)
+
√√√√ k∑
`=1
22` log
(
1
δ˜
)
,
k∑
`=1
(e` − 1)`
(e` + 1)
+
√√√√√ k∑
`=1
22` log
e+
√∑k
`=1 2
2
`
δ˜


Proof of Theorem 6. There are two types of releases by the aggregator to the data providers, over
various iterations and we bound the differential privacy for these releases individually.
1. Releases of hashes h1(·) and h2(·) over multiple iterations.
2. Release of information in the process of collecting data points from “winner” data sources.
We set auc = 3√2 log 1δ
K
−1
3 and τ = K
2
3 . For the analysis of differential privacy, consider two
datasets D and D ∪ {x}. Define an iteration as bad if (a) x is chosen by a data owner as marginally
the best point in Di (b) x is not chosen by the aggregator. By the virtue of our auction mechanism,
there are at most ` such bad iterations, beyond which the point x is chosen by the aggregator.
The key point to note is that if an iteration is not bad, then the output distribution, i.e., the probabilities
of chosen points by the aggregator remains unchanged.
Further, in a bad iteration, the bid-value position of a data source can change by at most 1, say
from i to i + 1 and thus the probability of choosing a point can change by a factor of at most
e−(i−1)auc
e−iauc = e
auc . Thus, these iterations are auc-differentially private.
Now, applying Theorem 7, we have:
∑`
b=1
(eauc − 1)auc
(eauc + 1)
≤
∑`
b=1
2auc = 
2
(8)
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and
√√√√∑`
b=1
22auc log
(
1
δ˜
)
=
√√√√√∑`
b=1
2 log 1
δ˜
2
18 log
(
1
δ˜
)
` log p
≤ 
3
(9)
In Algorithm 2, steps 6 and 7 together release i(t) and µi(t) (that are function of the final summary
Ds) which is used in the computation of Pt(s) which is used in the release from the aggregator to the
data owners. Each of them is ε differentially private. However, the `-th call to Algorithm 2 by the
protocol 3 uses ε = `,T . There are T steps inside each call.
We now set `,T = √
36T` log( 1
δ˜
) log p
, for iteration ` and apply Theorem 7 over all iterations. Firstly,
note that by basic calculus, for x ≥ 0, ex−1ex+1 ≤ x. This is because, setting f(x) = (ex−1)−x(ex+1)
has f(0) = 0 and f ′(x) = ex − (ex + 1)− x(ex + 1) <= 0.
Thus, we have,
p∑
`=1
2T∑
t=1
(e`,T − 1)`,T
(e`,T + 1)
≤
p∑
`=1
2T∑
t=1
2`,T
=
p∑
`=1
2
18 log
(
1
δ˜
)
` log p
≤ 
2
18 log
(
1
δ˜
)
log p
(
p∑
`=1
1
`
)
≤ 
3
(10)
and
√√√√ p∑
`=1
2T∑
t=1
22`,T log
(
1
δ˜
)
=
√√√√ p∑
`=1
2 log 1
δ˜
2
18 log
(
1
δ˜
)
` log p
≤ 
3
(11)
By Theorem 7, the protocol releases to any data owner is (˜, δ˜)-differentially private with respect to
Ds −Di where ˜ ≤ 3 + 3 + 3 = . A similar computation shows that the releases of the aggregator
during the protocol is (, δ˜)-differential private with respect to the validation set Dv .
Now, we bound the overall expected additive error of our protocol. Define err(E) as the expected
additive error in computing an expression E.
Lemma 3. Suppose in the greedy algorithm, Sq is the set of points chosen until iteration q and xq+1
be the new point chosen in iteration q + 1. Let Dv be the validation set. Let ξ denote the maximum
expected error in computing the terms, err(
∑
i∈Dv k(xq+1,yi)
m ) ≤ ξ and err(
∑
j∈Sq k(xq+1,yj)
q ) ≤ ξ.
Then the overall expected additive error of the algorithm is bounded by ∆ ≤ 7ξ ln p.
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Proof. Consider the marginal increment in J(.) in iteration q + 1:
J(Sq ∪ xq+1)− J(Sq)
=
2
m
 1q + 1 ∑
i∈Dv,j∈Sq+1
k(yi, xj)− 1
q
∑
i∈Dv,j∈Sq
k(yi, xj)

−
 1(q + 1)2 ∑
i,j∈Sq+1
k(xi, xj)− 1
q2
∑
i,j∈Sq
k(xi, xj)

=
1
q + 1
{
2
∑
i∈Dv k(xq+1, yi)
m
− q
q + 1
(1 + 2
∑
j∈Sq k(xq+1, xi))
q
}
+
(
1
q + 1
− 1
q
) ∑
q∈Sq
∑
i∈Dv k(xq, yi)
m
+(
1
(q + 1)2
− 1
q2
) ∑
i,j∈Sq
k(xi, xj) (12)
Now, we bound the additive error in computing this marginal increment as follows.
err(J(Sq ∪ xq+1)− J(Sq))
≤ 1
q + 1
err
(
2
∑
i∈Dv k(xq+1, yi)
m
)
+
q
(q + 1)2
err
(
2
∑
j∈Sq k(xq+1, xi)
q
)
+
(
1
q
− 1
q + 1
) ∑
q∈Sq
err
(∑
i∈Dv k(xq, yi)
m
)
+
(
q
q2
− q
(q + 1)2
) ∑
q∈Sq
err
(∑
j∈Sq k(xq, xj)
q
)
≤ 2ξ
q + 1
+
2qξ
(q + 1)2
+
1
q(q + 1)
∑
q∈Sq
ξ +
2q + 1
q(q + 1)2
∑
q∈Sq
ξ
=
2ξ
q + 1
+
2qξ
(q + 1)2
+
1
q(q + 1)
qξ +
2q + 1
q(q + 1)2
qξ ≤ 7ξ
q + 1
(13)
By Theorem 5, the overall expected additive error in the greedy algorithm is bounded by ∆ ≤∑
q∈[p] ∆q ≤
∑
q∈[p]
7ξ
q+1 ≤ 7ξ ln p
Lemma 4. Let 0 < a < 1 be a small fixed constant. Let |Dv| ≥ 11∗4
√
2
√
d log d log2 p
εv
, |Dinit| ≥
121 ∗ 8d2 log2 d log( 1
δ˜
) log5 p, d ≥ 16(log 2N)(log p)2a2 , η ≤ 1d , we have ∆ ≤ 7ξ ln p < O( log p
√
ln d√
d
) +
a+ 1 log p < 1.
Proof. Let N be total number of points in the system. First, we use a theorem from Rahimi & Recht
(2008), to show that P( sup
xi,xj
|h1(xi) · h1(xj)− k(xi, xj)| ≥ εrr) ≤ 1N2 . Indeed, for a fixed pair of
points, xi, xj , it holds that: P(|h1(xi) · h1(xj)− k(xi, xj)| ≥ εrr) ≤ exp (−dε
2
rr
4 ). Thus, by union
bound, and setting d ≥ 16 log 2Nε2rr , we have the above claim.
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Now, from Theorem 3, for iteration ` in the protocol, we have the following guarantee:
err
(
w(h1(Ds), i)
q
)
≤ 2
√
2 log(2/η)
d2
+ 11
√
2
log d
q`,T
√
d
+
4
d
+ 2d exp(−q/4) + η (14)
Observe that at iteration `, q = ` + |Dinit| since this is the effective size of the summary. By the
inequality between the arithmetic and geometric mean, we have: q ≥ √4`|Dinit|. Now, we let
|Dinit| ≥ 121 ∗ 8d2 log2 d log( 1δ˜ ) log
5 p. Now, we set η ≤ 1d . Then,
err
(
w(h1(Ds), i)
q
)
≤ 2
√
2 log(2/η)
d2
+
6
d
+
1√
d log2 p
= ∆max
Let h1(xq+1)[i] be the i-th coordinate of h1(xq+1). Observe that |h1(xq+1)[i]| ≤
√
2
d .
We have the following expected additive error:
err
(∑
j∈Ds k(xq+1, xj)
q
)
≤ εrr+
err
(∑
j∈Ds h1(xq+1) · h1(xj)
q
)
≤ εrr + ∆max
√
2d. (15)
We set err = a/ log p for some small constant a > 0. Therefore, d ≥ 16 log 2N(log p)2/a2. Now,
we have:
err
(∑
j∈Ds k(xq+1, xj)
q
)
≤ εrr + ∆max
√
2d
=
a
log p
+ 4
√
log(2/η)
d
+
6
√
2√
d
+
1
 log2 p
= O(
√
ln d√
d
) +
a
log p
+
1
 log2 p
(16)
Similarly, we can show that for validation set Dv, we need |Dv| ≥ 11 ∗ 4
√
2
√
d log d log2 p. Now,
since εv = ε√16d2 , the ∆max bound holds for the validation term too.
Lemma 5. In Algorithm 3 the expected number of points accessed by the aggregator is p(Kτ +
1
auc
) =
(1 +
3
√
2 log 1δ
 )pK
1
3 = O(
p log 1δ
 K
1
3 )
Proof. In the Step 13 of the mechanism, the expected number of points chosen in each iteration is∑
i∈[K] P(xi) =
∑
i∈[K] e
(i−1)auc = (1− e−Kauc)/(1− e−auc) ≤ 11−e−auc ≤ 1auc . Thus in p
iterations, the expected number of points chosen = pauc . In the second step, the maximum number
of points that are the best for a data source more than τ times is pKτ . Thus the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof follows from the results in this section.
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E Proof of Theorem 1
We begin by quoting a known result from Kim et al. (2016).
Theorem 8. Kim et al. (2016) Let H ∈ Rg×g be element-wise non-negative and bounded with
h∗ = max i, j ∈ [g]hi,j > 0. Define a binary matrix E with entries ei,j = 1 if hi,j = h∗ and 0
otherwise. Similarly define E′ = 1 − E. Given the ground set S ⊆ 2[g] consider the linear form:
F (H, S) = 〈A(S),H〉 ∀S ∈ S. Given s = |S|, define the functions:
α(g, s) = a(S∪{u})−a(S)b(S) , β(g, s) =
a(S∪{u})+a(S∪{v})−a(S∪{u,v})−a(S)
b(S)+b(S∪{u,v}) , where a(S) =
F (E, S) and b(S) = F (E′, S) for all u, v ∈ S. Let s∗ = maxS∈S |S|, we have
1. F (H, S) is monotone, if hi,j ≤ h∗α(g, s), ∀0 ≤ s ≤ s∗
2. F (H, S) is submodular, if hi,j ≤ h∗β(g, s), ∀0 ≤ s ≤ s∗
Proof of Theorem 1. Firstly, we show that the function J(S) can be written in a linear form. Note
that the same linear form used by Kim et al. (2016) would not work for our case.
We define U as the kernel matrix of all the points in D1 ∪D2 . . . Dk ∪Dv .
Now, we observe that our J(S) = 〈A(S),U〉, where A(S) = 2m|S|1[i∈S]1[j∈V ] − 1|S|21[i∈S]1[j∈S].
Let E as the binary matrix defined in Theorem 8 with H = U.
We now compute a(S) = 〈A(S),E〉 and b(S) = 〈A(S),1−E〉 values.
Computing a(S):
a(S) = 〈A(S), I〉 = 2
m|S|0−
1
|S|2 |S| = −
1
|S| (17)
Computing b(S):
b(S) = 〈A(S),1− I〉 = 〈A(S),1〉 − 〈A(S), I〉
=
2
m|S| |S|m−
1
|S|2 |S|
2 +
1
|S| =
1
|S| + 1 (18)
Now, we show that the bounds on α(g, s) and β(g, s) hold:
α(g, s) =
a(S ∪ {u})− a(S)
b(S)
=
1
|S| − 1|S|+1
1
|S| + 1
=
1
(1 + |S|)2 (19)
Further,
β(g, s) =
a(S ∪ {u}) + a(S ∪ {v})− a(S ∪ {u, v})− a(S)
b(S) + b(S ∪ {u, v})
=
− 2|S|+1 + 1|S|+2 + 1|S|
1
|S| + 1 +
1
|S|+2 + 1
=
1
n3 + 3n2 + n
(20)
Thus, we have ki,j ≤ β(g, s)k∗ and hence the conditions of the Theorem 8 are satisfied. Therefore,
J(S) is a monotone and submodular function.
F Additional Privacy Properties of h1(·) :
Consider any data set Dr. Over the course of p epochs, suppose the data source r contributes
pr points by winning bids at Line 7 of Algorithm 3. Let the points be x1,x2, . . . ,xpr . We
show that the joint probability density function of the random variables h1(x1), . . . , h1(xpr ) de-
pends only on the pairwise distances between the points, i.e. ‖xu − xv‖ ∀u, v ∈ [1 : pr]. In
a strong information theoretic sense, this implies that the only information that can be gained
about these points by the aggregator are the pairwise distances between the data points. The
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intention of usage of the hashes is to compute k(xu,xv) = k(‖xu − xv‖2) approximately at
the aggregator. Hence, the aggregator gains strictly no more information than it needs. Con-
sider the matrix
[
h1(x1)
T , . . . , h1(xpr )
T
]T
. Each column of this matrix is an i.i.d sample drawn
from the distribution on the variables:
[√
2/d cos(wTx1 + b) . . .
√
2/d cos(wTxpr + b)
]
where
w ∼ N(0, 2γIn), b ∼ Uniform[0, 2pi]. In fact, we will analyze the joint characteristic function of
the angles in a single column given by:
[
(wTx1 + b) mod 2pi . . . (w
Txpr + b) mod 2pi
]T
. In an
intuitive sense, these variables represent a randomly shifted jointly Gaussian variables ‘wrapped’
around a unit circle (usually called the wrapped distribution Mardia & Jupp (2009)). The next theorem
shows that the characteristic function depends only on the pairwise distance of the data points.
Theorem 9. Let φw(·) be the characteristic function of the wrapped distribution of the variables[
(wTx1 + b) mod 2pi, . . . , (w
Txpr + b) mod 2pi
]
. Then, we have: a) ∀s ∈ Rpr −Zpr , φw(s) =
0. b) ∀k ∈ Zpr , 1k 6= 0, φw(k) = 0. c) ∀k ∈ Zpr , 1k 6= 0, φw(k) = φ(k) =
∏
i,j∈[1:pr]
(
φ(i,j)
)mi,j
where mi,j are some integers that depend on the vector k alone. Here, φ(i,j) = exp(−2γ‖xi −
xj‖22) = k(‖xi − xj‖2).
Remark: We are not aware of any analysis of the joint distribution of multiple data point releases
using Rahimi-Recht random features method for the RBF kernel. We use Fourier analysis, properties
of multi-dimensional Dirac-combs Giraud & Peschanski (2015) to prove the above theorem.
F.1 Proof of Theorem 9
We first review results relating characteristic function of unwrapped distributions and the wrapped
distributions. This relationships is due to some facts known about multi-dimensional Dirac Comb in
standard Fourier Analysis. Let p(v) be a density function defined on Rs. Here p(·) is the unwrapped
joint density function of the variables,
[
wTx1 + b . . .w
Txpr + b
]
. Here, v ∈ Rs. The wrapped
distribution of this density function is given by: pw(v) =
∑
k∈Zn
p(v + 2pik). Define the Dirac comb
as: ∆2pi(v) =
∑
k∈Zs
δ(v − 2pik) where δ(v) = ∏i δ(vi) and δ(·) is a single dimensional Dirac-delta
function. Although Dirac-delta functions are not rigorous as a real function, as a measure on the
space Rs, they are very well defined and rigorous.
It is known that the Fourier Series of the Dirac comb is given by:
∆2pi(v) =
1
(2pi)s
∑
k∈Zs
exp(−ikTv) (21)
Therefore, any wrapped distribution can be written in the following way:
pw(v) =
∫
p(v′)∆2pi(v − v′)dv′
=
1
(2pi)s
∫
p(v′)
∑
k∈Zs
exp(−ikT (v − v′))dv′ (22)
=
1
(2pi)s
∑
k∈Zs
φ(k) exp(−ikTv) (23)
Here, φ(k) = Ep[exp(ikv)] is the characteristic function of the distribution p(·) on the integer lattice.
Therefore, any wrapped distribution can be written as a Fourier series with Fourier Coefficients being
the characteristic function evaluated at the integer lattice.
Let φw(·) be the characteristic function of the wrapped distribution. Further, φw(k) = φ(k), ∀k ∈
Z+ while φw(s) = 0 when s ∈ Rs Zs is not on the integer lattice. This is very clear from the Fourier
serier representation of the wrapped distribution as in (22).
Lemma 6. φw(k) = φ(k) = 0, ∀k : 1Tk 6= 0 when p(·) is the unwrapped joint distribution of[
wTx1 + b . . .w
Txpi + b
]
where w ∼ N (0, 2γIn) and b ∼ Uniform[0, 2pi].
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Proof. Let X =
[
xT1 . . .x
T
pr
]T
. Therefore, variables wTxj are jointly Gaussian with the covariance
matrix Σ = XXT . Given a fixed b, the conditional characteristic function over the integer lattice is
given by:
φ|b(k) = exp(i(kT1)b) exp(−1
2
kTΣk) (24)
This is the characteristic function of the standard multidimensional normal distribution.
Eb[exp(imb)] = 0 for an integer m and b ∼ Uniform[0, 2pi]. Therefore, by (24), we have the desired
result.
We will show that the φ(k) is a function only of the pairwise distances between the points whenever
1Tk = 0.
Lemma 7. Let k(i,j) = [0 . . . 1
position i
. . . . . . −1
position j
]). Then, φ
(
k(i,j)
)
= exp(−2γ‖xi − xj‖22).
Further, whenever kT1 = 0, φw(k) = φ(k) =
∏
i,j∈[1:pr]
(
φ
(
k(i,j)
))mi,j where mi,j are some
integers that depend on the vector k alone.
Proof of Lemma 7. Whenever kT1 = 0, by (24) φ(k) is a function of ‖kTX‖2. Let ∑ |ki| =
2t, t ∈ Z+. The sum of absolute values is an even integer because ∑ ki = 0. Now, we can write
‖kTX‖2 as follows:
‖kTX‖2 = ‖
t∑
j=1
(gi − hi)‖22 (25)
where gi = xj for some j ∈ [1 : pr] and hi = xk for some k ∈ [1 : pr]. Because any distinct data
point xj is multiplied only by either positive or negative integers, clearly {gi}ti=1
⋂{hi}ti= = ∅.
Now, we have:
‖
t∑
j=1
(gi − hi)‖22 =
t∑
j=1
‖(gj − hj)‖22+
2 ∗
∑
j,j′
(gj − hj)T (gj′ − hj′) (26)
The first terms set of terms clearly are function of pairwise distances between points. Now we rewrite
the cross terms as linear combination of pairwise distances in the following way.
2 ∗ (gj − hj)T (gj′ − hj′) = ‖gj − hj′‖22 + ‖gj′ − hj‖22
− ‖gj − gj′‖22 − ‖hj − hj′‖22 (27)
Hence, characteristic function can be written as pairwise distances between the data points.
Let k(i,j) = [0 . . . 1
position i
. . . . . . −1
position j
]). Then, φ
(
k(i,j)
)
= exp(−2γ‖xi − xj‖22). These are
exactly the kernel values that the Aggregator is interested in. By (26) and (27), it is clear that the
characteristic function can be written in terms of powers of φ
(
k(i,j)
)
, i.e.
φ(k) =
∏
i,j∈[1:pr]
(
φ
(
k(i,j)
))mi,j
(28)
where mi,j are some integers that depend on the vector k alone.
Proof of Theorem 9. The results of the two lemmas above prove the theorem.
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G Additional Experiments
As discussed before, we set the parameters of our algorithm as in Table 1.
γ = 0.1 d = 140
Tinit(= T, ` = 1) =
d1.5 = 1656 Tsubs(= T, ` ≥ 2) = 5
εv ε`,T
0.01 0.05 for ` = 1, 0.01√
pTsubs
for ` ≥ 2
Table 1: We describe the parameters for our experiments. Here γ is the RBF kernel parameter. d
is the dimension of the Rahimi-Recht hash function h1(·). We use two different T parameters for
different epochs given by Tinit (for the first epoch) and Tsubs (for subsequent epochs). v is the 
parameter for h2(·) for the validation set and `,T is set for h2(·) on summaries Ds over epochs `.
MNIST Dataset: We now demonstrate similar results on a standard hand-written digit recognition
dataset namely MNIST. We start with a brief description of the setup.
Training: We distribute the MNIST training dataset among five data owners based on digit labels as
follows. Splitting the digits into groups [[0, 1], [3, 4], [5, 6], [7, 8], [9, 2], we allocate the training data
corresponding to these digits to the corresponding data owners. Testing: The test set contains data
corresponding to two labels [3, 4] sampled with ratio [0.7, 0.3]. Validation: We sample (and remove)
from the test set with probability 0.25 to construct the validation dataset.
Figure 2: MNIST Dataset (Top): Comparison of the percentage increase in MMD2 of both the
private and uniform sampling algorithms with respect to baseline greedy algorithm. Lower values
indicate better performance. Consistently there is 10-15% performance difference from uniform
sampling. (Bottom): Comparison of the classification accuracy of the three algorithms using a neural
network with one hidden layer of 32 units. Higher numbers indicate better performance.
As before, we vary the number of samples and in Figure 2, compare the percentage increase in
MMD2 with respect to greedy, i.e., MMD
2(ALGM)−MMD2(GREEDY )
MMD2(GREEDY ) × 100. Recall from above
that ALGM is either our private greedy algorithm or the uniform sampling algorithm. Our results
show that we consistently outperform the uniform sampling algorithm by at least 10-13%. In Figure 2,
we compare the performance of these algorithms using a neural net with 32 neurons in a single hidden
layer and drop out of 0.2. Note that since our goal is to demonstrate that the relative performance
of these algorithms, we are not concerned with the actual performance numbers (prior works on
this subject in fact use a much simple 1-Nearest Neighbor classifier). We again find that the private
algorithm beats uniform sampling in most cases.
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